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1.  Introduction
Two 'storms'  have recently raged over the distribution of income in Chile. The first, and
most  irnportant, was caused by  a  series of structural  reforms of the  economy - which
started in 1974 and were largely completed by the late eighties - and by successive changes
in  political  regime  - which  had  important  implications,  among  other  things,  for  the
regulation  of  labor  markets.  The  economic  reforms  included  trade  liberalization,
privatization of state-owned assets, deregulation of various markets, and reforms  in the
structure of taxes, subsidies and benefits. They have been extensively discussed elsewhere,
and are well beyond the scope of this paper. See Edwards and Edwards (1987) and Scott
(1996) for  excellent summaries. The political  changes were fundamentally  the military
coup d'etat  of  1973, which installed General Pinochet as President, and the restoration of
democracy in 1990, with the election of President Aylwin.
The second storm, closer to the 'tea cup'  variety, has raged in academic and policy circles,
as the effects of the "Chilean model" on poverty and inequality were hotly debated. This
storm  also had  two  separable components which,  for convenience, I will  name "Chile
versus Stolper-Samuelson" and "See, All is Not Well After All". The former component
originates from the finding that, as Chile liberalized its trade regime, the ratio of skilled
workers'  wages to  those  of the unskilled rose, rather than fell  (Robbins,  1994). If the
Chilean and the world economies could be well approximated by a model where unskilled
and skilled labor were the only two factors of production, and the other Hecksher-Ohlin
assumptions  held  (notably  constant technology  and  no  non-tradable  goods),  then  this
finding would violate the predictions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which establishes
the links between goods and factor prices in a Hecksher-Ohlin world. If Chile - like other
developing countries - had relatively abundant supplies of unskilled labor, opening up to
trade  should increase  the returns  to  this  factor  relative to  those  to  skilled  labor - the
opposite of what Prof. Robbins found.3
The second  strand ("See, All is Not Well After All") draws on Robbins's  findings, but
percolates  beyond  academia  to  Chilean  politics  and  society  more  broadly.  The
Concertacion  governments  of  Presidents  Aylwin  and  Frei  have  made  "Growth  with
Equity" their paramount objective. A failure to promote equity - indeed the observation of
actual increases in inequality - can be seized upon as evidence of their failure to deliver on
their stated objectives. Income distribution statistics became increasingly important in the
Chilean  political  and  social debate  of the  mid-1990s, to  the  point where  the  Catholic
Church's  Conferencia Episcopal de Chile issued an open letter in January 1996. entitled
"Is  Chile  an Equitable  Country?".  Its concluding section opened by  stating that  "'...the
current  distribution  of  income  in  our  country  should  be  cause  for  scandal  among
Christians..  .The distance between the rich and the poor has grown in Chile in an alarming
fashion.  A solidary country can not  accept this  reality. Neither can  a  modern country
tolerate these differences." (Comision Nacional de Justicia y Paz, 1996, p.24).
Indeed, although there was no single national household survey which collected detailed
information on  incomes from  all  sources with a  regular  periodicity prior  to  1985, the
consensus is that inequality in Chile did rise substantially throughout the 1960s, l970s and
1980s (except for a brief decline in 1970-73). This information is largely based on the long
time-series of the Universidad de Chile Household Survey data, which covers only Greater
Santiago.  Riveros (1983) was the first  to note the rising  trend  in the  Gini  coefficient,
focusing on the period from 1958 to  1982. This was corroborated by Robbins (1994), and
by Montenegro  (1996),  for wage  incomes, although  both authors  found that  the trend
changed  in  1990. More recently, using the  only national  data  available,  Londono  and
Szekely (1997) confirmed these findings  for total  household incomes,  across the entire
country. Data points  satisfying these requirements prior to  1990 are only  available  for
1971, 1980 and 1989. Londono and Szekely (1997) report the Gini coefficient rising over
those three years from  0.47 to 0.53 and 0.59. They too found a reversal beginning in 1990,
with the Gini falling to 0.57 in 1994.4
Nevertheless - although Robbins (1994) finds a decline in skilled/unskilled wage ratio from
1990 to  1992; Montenegro (1996) finds that the wage Gini for greater Santiago falls from
0.57 in  1987 to 0.46 in 1996; and Londono and Szekely report the aforementioned small
decline in the national total income Gini between 1989 and 1994 - there does not yet seem
to be a consensus on the post-1990 part of the story. Robbins (1995) himself plays down
the post-1990  decline, attributing it to the rise  in numbers  of university graduates from
'low-quality'  private universities. The Bishops who wrote the aforementioned  1996 letter
clearly also doubt that there has been an improvement since the turn of the decade. Having
become accustomed to three decades of rising inequality, it is as if Chilean society (and
some foreign economists) refuse to believe that a reversal was possible, and wonder what
economic mechanisms might underlie it. Meller (1996), suggested that a reduction in wage
disparities  might be  due,  after all, to  Stolper-Samuelson at work.  Robbins (1996)  and
Wood (1997) remained unconvinced.
In part, room for this  controversy is generated by the absence of a thorough, definitive
analysis of the best available data since 1987. Such an approach should be based on as
solid a treatment of the data as possible, taking issues such as regional price variations and
differences  in  family  composition  into  account.  It  should  also  overcome  the  inherent
ambiguity of inequality analysis based on scalar measures: income share ratios might fall,
while Ginis rise; coefficients of variation might suggest increasing dispersion, while the
mean  log deviation  suggests declines. And  it should deal explicitly  with  the statistical
nature of inequality analysis: some of the changes observed, particularly in the 1990s, have
been so small that one wonders whether they are statistically significant.
This paper aims to fill that gap, and to contribute to the debate on the dynamics of personal
income  distribution  in  Chile  by  establishing  which  facts  and  conclusions  are  indeed
empirically robust. It provides a comprehensive description of the levels of and changes in
poverty  and  inequality  in  Chile  from  1987 to  1994, d:awing  primarily  on  a  detailed
analysis of four household survey microdata sets - the CASEN surveys of  1987,  1990,
1992 and  1994 - which are discussed briefly in Section 2 below, and described in more5
detail in Appendix  1. We address the ambiguity of scalar welfare, poverty and inequality
measurement by relying on stochastic dominance techniques. The paper incorporates the
need for statistical testing of hypotheses about changes in income distribution, by applying
the  Howes  (1993)  intersection-union  test  for  statistical  significance  of  stochastic
dominance. It also addresses the issue of robustness with respect to the assumptions made
about different needs across households and economies of scale within them, by presenting
all results for equivalised income, as well as for per capita income. Finally, we present a set
of  static  and  dynamic  inequality  decompositions,  to  shed  some  light  on  the  possible
economic  determinants  of  our  findings,  and  comment  on  how  these  might  relate to
previous work on Chilean income distribution in an open-trade regime.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section briefly discusses the concepts
analyzed in this study, describes the data set on which the analysis is based, and some of
our methodological assumptions.  Section 3 presents the basic results  on  inequality and
welfare, by means of scalar measures, decile means and shares, and stochastic dominance.
Section 4 discusses the evolution of the poverty indicators, after presenting the rationale
for our choice of poverty lines. Section 5 delves behind the statistics, and seeks to shed
some light on the factors that can help explain the levels and changes in inequality, through
both static and dynamic decomposition analyses. It also suggests how the results may be
reconciled with earlier findings in the "Chile versus Stolper-Samuelson" debate. Section 6
concludes.
2.  Concepts, Data and Methodology
In  studying the evolution  of the Chilean distribution  of income during  1987-1994, this
paper  presents  results  concerning  three  distinct,  but  related  concepts:  social  welfare,
poverty and inequality. Social welfare is perhaps the vaguest of the three concepts: it seeks
to  capture  the  level  of  well-being  of  a  society  or  population.  Due  to  information
constraints, it is usually proxied in household survey studies by income or consumption6
2 expenditure . Many have argued for more encompassing measures, which would include a
value  for  leisure  or  other  non-monetary  dimensions  of  quality  of  life,  such  as  the
availability of public goods, whether environmental in nature or not. 3 While the inclusion
of these dimensions would be ideal in principle, we are constrained in practice - by data
availability and reliability - to relying on either consumption expenditure or income.
Since the  CASEN  surveys, widely regarded  in  Chile  as the  best  available  sources of
information on households since their creation in 1985, use income as the welfare concept
surveyed, so will this paper. Hence, the social welfare measures we will be concerned with
are non-decreasing  functions of current income, and  are symmetric (not discriminating
between different recipients along any dimension other than income). We will not present
values  for  any  specific  social  welfare measures  in  this  study,  relying  instead  on  the
theorems of stochastic dominance discussed below to investigate changes in social welfare.
In seeking to measure welfare, whose current income should one consider? The income
distributions conventionally studied in the Chilean literature have been hiousehold income
per capita per household distributions; which is to say that the income unit was hiousehold
income per  capita, and the recipient unit was the household. This  causes  a  nllmber of
inconveniences, such as having smaller shares of the population in higher deciles 4 thlan in
2Among  tlhose  two, there are two reasons  why expenditure  is usually  the preferred  welfare  indicator.  First,  if
capital markets  work  at all, it is a better  proxy  for permanent  income.  Second,  there is a growinig  consensus
among practitioners  that household survey income data is less reliable than expenditure  data, due to a
number of problems related to mis-reporting and mis-measurement. See Deaton (1995) and Chauduri  and
Ravallion  (1994) for discussions. Chile's  last available expenditure survey, however,  is the  Encuesta de
Presupuestos Familiares of  1987/88. Apart from being old and  incapable of providing any information on
changes during the recent high-growth period, it only covered the Metropolitan Region of Santiago.
Becker (1965) proposed a 'full income' concept which included an imputed value for leisure. Sen (1981)
proposed a concept of entitlements which aimed to capture some of the benefits of public goods, in
addition to the value of income.
Strictly speaking, a decile is a separator. There are nine deciles, and decile i is the income which separates
tenth i from tenth i+] in the distribution. Like other quantiles (e.g. percentiles or quintiles), the word for
decile is widely misused to refer to the actual tenth (or hundredth, or fifth) of the distribution. Rather
than confuse the reader by departing from the usual misnomer, decile will be used to mean tentlh  in this
Report, as will its finer and coarser analogues.7
lower  ones (as household  size declines with  household income per capita in  Clhile, see
MIDEPLAN, 1992, p.34), or having a headcount poverty measure which is less than the
proportion of the population (in persons) which is poor. We therefore adopt thie individual
as the recipient unit throughout: all our distributions are vectors of individuals. The income
they are imputed is one of two income concepts we adopt: household income per capita, to
allow for some comparisons with previous studies and for ease of direct interpretation; and
household income per equivalent adult, to take account of differences in needs arising from
distinct household sizes and compositions. A discussion of the specific equivalence scale
used is included below.
Poverty can  be thought  of  as the negative of  some welfare  function, over  a  censored
distribution. It is negative, in the sense that a rise in poverty, everything else constanit, is a
decline  in  welfare.  More  importantly:  poverty  measures are  defined  over  a  censored
distribution in the sense that they measure the welfare of those below a certain threshold in
the overall distribution. 5 That threshold is the poverty line which, in this case as in many
others, is defined as an  absolute income level (fixed over time  in  real terms)  which is
judged  just  sufficient  to  provide  an  individual  with  minimum  nutritional  and  other
requirements. Details are discussed in Section 4.
Inequality, like welfare,  is  defined over  complete distributions  of an  indicator.  Unlike
welfare, however, it is independent from the mean of those distributions, concerning itself
only with  their second moment. Inequality measures are defined over mean-normalized
income  distributions,  and  are  generally  required  to  satisfy  the  Pigou-Dalton  transfer
principle, which demands the measure to rise (or at least not fall) in response to a mean-
preserving spread.
There are, of course, many different such inequality measures, which may quite validly
5  Most poverty measures, including all those used in this study, satisfy the focus axiom, which requires them
to be invariant with respect to any change in income levels above the poverty line.8
rank the same two distributions in opposite ways, if they are more sensitive to distances in
different parts of the distribution. The best remedy to this ambiguity is to rely on stochastic
dominance, which is discussed below, but we will also present four different inequality
measures, to provide information on changes from a number of different  'perspectives'.
We will present values for the Gini coefficient (which is most sensitive to incomes in the
middle of the distribution), the mean log deviation (which is most sensitive to incomes in
the bottom of the distribution), the Theil index (whose sensitivity is constant across the
distribution)  and a transform of the coefficient of variation (which is most  sensitive to
incomes at the top of the distribution). Their formulae are given in Section 3.
Let us now turn briefly to the data sets of the Caracterizaci6n Socioecon6mica Nacional
(CASEN), for the years of  1987, 1990, 1992 and  1994, on which the analysis below is
6  7 based.  The CASEN is a nationally and regionally representative  household survey carried
out  by  the  Chilean  Ministry  of  Planning  (MIDEPLAN),  through  the  Department  of
Economics of the Universidad de Chile, with the dual objectives of  generating a reliable
portrait of socioeconomic conditions across the country, and of monitoring the incidence
and effectiveness of the government's  social programs and expenditures. With these ends,
questions  are asked pertaining both to  the household and to the  individuals witllin  the
household. Topics covered include demographics; characteristics of the dwelling; access to
utilities  and  public  services;  educational  attainment  (if  currently  enrolled,  detailed
questions are asked about the school, method of education financing, benefits, etc.); health
conditions; health  insurance; health services used and benefits received; occupation and
employment;  and  incomes.  Income  questions  are  designed  to  permit  the  distinction
between labor incomes in cash, labor incomes in kind (agricultural and non-agricultural),
income from capital, rental income, imputed rent, employment-related transfers (such as
occupational, invalidity or widow's  pensions.) and entitlement transfers (such as the basic
6 A first  CASEN  survey  was  conducted  in 1985,  but it is widely  reported  to be less  reliable,  of inferior
quality  than  and less  comparable  with  the  subsequent  ones.
7Representativeness  at the  level  of the  comuna  has  also  become  increasingly  widespread,  as  sample  sizes
have increased  over  time, but can not be assumed  for all  comunas.9
pensions  PASIS  or the  family allowance  SUF). Details on  the  sampling methlodology
employed by Universidad de Chile, as well as on the adjustments made to the raw data by
CEPAL, are provided in Appendix 1.
The income variable from the CASEN used as the welfare indicator in this study is total
household income, further adjusted in two ways. First, the income vector was deflated by a
regional price index, with Santiago as the base location. Traditionally, nominal  incomes
have only been deflated by a common national consumer price index, taking no account of
regional  variations  in  price  levels which,  as  Table  1 indicates, can  in  some  cases  be
considerable. This is reinforced by Chile's geography, with extreme southern and northern
regions  having  substantially higher  average prices  than  those  closer  to  Santiago.  Our
regional price deflation is based on the only source of prices outside Santiago, the National
Statistical Institute's  (INE) Anuario de Precios survey of 16 cities. 8 Given the variation in
price levels from year to year, we used an average of the index from  1985 to  1994; the
values are given in Table  1 below. Regionally adjusted incomes were then deflated over
time  by  the national  consumer price  index  for November  (the  survey month)  of  the
relevant years,  as given  in  CEPAL (1995, p.  24).  All  income values  reported  in  this
chapter, therefore, are expressed in 1994 Santiago pesos.
8  There  are no systematic  surveys  of prices in  rural areas  anywhere  in Chile.  Though  in the past  rIural  prices
have been  assumed  to be lower  than in urban  areas, we have  found  no  justification  for this arbitrary
mark-down,  and generalized  urban  prices  to the whole  region.10
Table 1:  Regional  Prices  The second adjustment was to introduce the concept
Region  Price Index  of  household income per equivalent adult, through
I  1.2163
II  1.1668  the adoption of an equivalence scale. This was done
III  1.1112  to capture the changes in measured inequality and
IV  1.0859
V  1.0420  poverty which arise out of taking into account the
VI  1.0269  differences in needs between households with
VII  1.0136
VIII  1.0441  different compositions (e.g. four adults as opposed
IX  1.0500  to a couple with two small children), as well as
X  1.0383
XI  1.0856  economies of scale which arise from sharing fixed
XII  1.2208  housing or other costs. There are a number of
XIII  (RM.)  1.0000  different  approaches  to  deriving  an  equivalence
scale, and there is no single accepted dominant method. Rather than attaching excessive
importance to  the  specific  values of  our  chosen  coefficients, we  sought to  provide  a
reasonably reliable alternative to the per capita income concept, which is well known to
constitute an extreme assumption in terms of differences in needs (none), as well as in
terms of (the absence of) economies of scale.
Our chosen  scale is a revised version of the equivalence scale for Chile, calculated by
Contreras (1995), using the Rothbarth adult goods method. Contreras's scale was estimated
excluding  all  households  with  a  single  adult  from  the  sample,  and  taking  two-adult
households as the reference type. He found that adult good expenditures were restored to
the childless couple level when incomes for families with one child in the age categories
below was raised by the percentage amount indicated:
2  _Propo~onal  Compensating Variation  s  for Children  in  Chile
Child  age  No child  0-4 yrs  5-10  yrs  X ll-15 yrs
Cost increase  0%  15%  20%  140%
The entries  in Table 2 are a bottom-line  approximation.  While  they capture  the results  at an appropriate
level of confidence,  they do not do  justice  to the complexity  of the estimation  method,  and do not take
into account  the different  standard  errors  associated  with  different  age categories.  See Contreras  (1995)
for these and other  details.11
Since we must also cover those households made up by a single individual, and in order to
take into account some economies of scale within the household, we assume the cost of a
single person to be 60% of that of a couple (roughly equivalent to saying that the second
adult costs 70% of the cost of the first adult'0). Our equivalence scale is therefore:
Yj= Xj  /Mj,  with M,  =  1.2 + 0.8 (Naa  + N 11.,5) + 0.4 N5-0+ 0.3 No- 4
where: Naa is the number of additional adults in the household;
N,  115 is the number of children aged 11-15 (inc) in the household;
N 5 s l  is the number of children aged 5-10 (inc) in the household;
No 0 4 is the number of children aged 0-4 (inc) in the household.
Note  that this  has maintained  households with two adults as the reference group. Their
household income will be divided by two. An additional child in the  11  -15 age category
'costs'  an extra 40%, as before. An additional child in the 5-10 category costs an extra
20%, as before. An additional child in the 0-4 age category costs an extra 15%, as before.
The second adult accounts for 40% of the couple's total costs.
By introducing the equivalence scale and the regional price adjustments directly on to the
incomes  to  be  analyzed,  consistency  is  ensured  in  the  assumptions  underlying  the
inequality and the poverty analyses. Also, since all incomes are effectively expressed in
1994 Santiago pesos, there will be no need for regional poverty lines. Lines expressed in
1994 Santiago pesos will be the appropriate comparators for all incomes. Similarly, there
will be no need for poverty lines for different household types; it will suffice to compare
the household incomes per equivalent adult with an individual adult poverty  line.'I  The
advantage of this approach over introducing those concepts through different poverty lines,
This is a common  assumption,  adopted  for instance  in  the construction  of the OECD  equivalence  scale
(see OECD,  1982).
Though  the absolute  values of the poverty  measures  do, of course,  depend  on the household  r eference
type chosen  in defining  the scale.12
in addition to simplicity, is that the inequality analysis would not then - as it does now -
incorporate regional price and equivalence scale adjustments.
In the next section, the analysis of inequality and welfare changes relies on equivalised
household  income,  based  on  the equivalence  scale  described  above. In  order  both  to
preserve comparability with previous studies and to demonstrate the robustness of the main
results to  the adoption of the scale, the analysis is replicated for household incomes per
capita, in Appendix 2.
3.  Levels and Changes in Chilean Inequality and Social Welfare
Before presenting the detailed results, it is worthwhile highlighting the broad picture which
arises from the data, and which  can be characterized by three  'stylized  facts'.  First, the
entire distribution function has been shifting to the right over time, with people in tlle same
relative ranks earning higher incomes in later years. Though this is not strictly the case for
every segment of the distribution in every year, it is the general case.  This is clearly the
result  of  economic  growth.  Second,  the  dispersion  of  the  distribution  seems  to  have
remained broadly stable as it moved to the right over this period. If anything, there is some
indication of a slight reduction in overall inequality, though there are no significant and
unambiguous changes in inequality between any of the years surveyed by CASEN. 3 This
would  suggest that the benefits of economic growth have been distributed  in a  pattern
roughly similar to that of the existing income distribution. Third, to the extent that there
were any discernible changes in the shape of the density function, within the broad context
of stability, these appear to have been a slight compression in the lower tail, and a slight
increase in dispersion in the upper tail: inequality among the poor fell, while inequality
The  first  order  welfare  dominance  results  reported  below  specify  the instances  when it was actually  true
for  the  entire  distribution.
13  In the sense  that there are no statistically  significant  Lorenz  dominances  between  any two  years in our
sample.  See  below.13
among the very rich, and between them and those just  poorer than them, seems to have
increased.
As stated in the previous section, the four scalar inequality measures used in this study are
the  Gini  Coefficient, the  mean  log  deviation, the Theil  index  and  a  transform of  the
coefficient of variation. In their formulae below, we use the following standard notation: yi
is the income of individual i, i  E  (1, 2, ..., n), n is the number of individuals  in a given
distribution, and j(y)  is the arithmetic mean of the distribution.
The Gini is given by  G=  1  E  y.  E  I  Y
2n2yy  =
The other three measures are all members of the Generalized Entropy class of inequality
indices, which  satisfy  a  number of desirable  properties, such as  symmetry,  population
replication,  scale  invariance  and  decomposability.  See  Cowell  (1995)  for  details.  The
general formula for the parametric class is given by:
E(aZ)  =  _Ed_|  _(
a  - a~ n  =,uy
Using l'Hopital's  rule, one can obtain E(O),  the mean log deviation:
E(O)  1  Elog
Similarly, the Theil index corresponds to E(l), which is given by:
E(1) = I  EY'  log
n =(Y)
The fourth measure we have employed is E(2), which can be expressed as:
I  2 E(2) = 2  p(y  ))
'UY  (yi  -~()
2nuy)  =,14
Table 3 below lists mean and median incomes, as well as these four inequality measures,
for the household income per equivalent adult distribution in each of the four years we
analyze.
. :  i.ithIy  Househol lIncom  erEq uivalent Adult
1987  1990  1992  1994
Mean Income  67,232  75,007  90,797  93,981
Median  36,265  42,455  50,212  53,196
Gini  0.5468  0.5322  0.5362  0.5298
E(O)  0.5266  0.4945  0.4891  0.4846
E(1)  0.6053  0.5842  0.6151  0.5858
E(2)  1.3007  1.3992  1.5050  1.5634
The impact of economic growth can be seen immediately, through the sharp upward trend
in mean and median incomes. The large differences between the mean and the median,
which persist  over the period, are an indication of the skewness of the distribution. The
four measures of inequality confirm the high level of inequality in Chile, by international
standards. 14
In terms of temporal evolution, the Gini coefficient, which is especially sensitive neither to
the top nor to the bottom of the distribution, changes very little over the period. Though
there is a slight decline in its value, it is unlikely to be statistically significant. The Theil
index (E(1)) behaves slightly differently, displaying a sine pattern. It does not suggest a
strong trend in either direction either. The other two measures are suggestive of the small
4 While  the  average  Gini  coefficient  for  Chile  in this period  -with respect  to distributions  of household
incomes  per  capita  (see  Appendix  2) for comparability  - was 0.5539,  a recently  compiled  international
inequality  database  indicates  that  the  average  Gini in the  1980s  (1990s)  was  0.3323  (0.3375)  in
industrialized  countries  and  high-income  developing  countries;  0.2501  (0.2894)  in Eastern  Europe;
0.3501  (0.3188)  in South  Asia;  0.3870  (0.3809)  in East  Asia and  the  Pacific;  0.4045  (0.3803)  in  the
Middle  East  and  North  Africa;  0.4346  (0.4695)  in Sub-Saharan  Africa  and  0.4975 (0.493  1) in Latin
America  and  the  Caribbean.  See Deininger  and  Squire  (1996).  Not only  is Chile  in quite  a different
inequality  league  from  industrialized  countries,  or indeed  from  those  in Asia,  but  it also  has a  Gini
coefficient  above  the  Latin  American  average.15
changes referred to above: the mean log deviation (E(0)), which is particularly sensitive to
low incomes, falls a little more markedly than the Gini throughout. E(2), a transform of the
coefficient of variation which picks up differences in the upper tail with greater weight,
rises monotonically from the beginning to the end of the period. Overall, there appears to
be  limited change in  inequality, but  with greater distances at the top  compensating for
smaller distances at the bottom.  Tables 4  and  5 below  allow us to  investigate a  more
disaggregated picture, by listing decile means and shares for per capita household incomes.
Table 4:  Decile Mean Incomes: Household Incomes per Equivalent Adult
(1994 Santiago Pesos)
1987  1990  1992  1994
Decile 1  9036.39  10405.88  13811.73  13468.71
Decile 2  16205.31  19245.45  23615.58  24126.88
Decile 3  21285.65  24970.63  30687.34  31567.66
Decile 4  26700.95  31421.56  37740.56  39265.97
Decile 5  32816.62  38564.88  45765.64  48300.51
Decile 6  40599.89  47079.28  55930.66  59518.87
Decile 7  51487.53  59378.09  70167.22  74523.33
Decile 8  68820.84  77958.43  92232.57  99180.40
Decile 9  105610.50  116361.20  134597.00  148112.80
Decile 10  299725.50  324647.70  403411.90  402088.70
Top Percentile  808409.30  926408.60  1241728.00  1180673.00
Table 5:  Decile Income Shares: Household Incomes per Equivalent Adult  ("/o)
1987  1990  1992  1994
Decile 1  1.34  1.39  1.52  1.43
Decile 2  2.41  2.57  2.60  2.57
Decile 3  3.17  3.33  3.38  3.36
Decile 4  3.97  4.19  4.16  4.18
Decile 5  4.88  5.14  5.04  5.14
Decile 6  6.04  6.28  6.16  6.33
Decile 7  7.66  7.92  7.73  7.93
Decile 8  10.24  10.39  10.16  10.55
Decile 9  15.71  15.51  14.82  15.76
Decile 10  44.58  43.28  44.43  42.73
Top Percentile  12.02  12.35  13.68  12.4116
Table 4 offers remarkable confirmation of the gains from economic growth to all deciles of
the Chilean income distribution. In fact, every single decile has seen its average income
rise in every sub-period, with only two exceptions: the bottom and the top deciles in 1994.
This  sustained increase  in real  incomes across the distribution,  over  a period  of seven
years, is an achievement most countries would be proud of.
As for the exceptions, the fall in mean income for the first decile in  1994 has been the
subject of considerable debate in Chile since the data first became available. This study
confirms that the decline also took place in terms of household incomes per equivalent
adult. There seems to be little question that it was due, at least in part, to the decli ne in the
overall rate of  GDP growth, which was 11.8% in the second semester of 1992. and 4.3%
in the same period of 1994. In particular, this cyclical deceleration - brought about largely
by contractionary  monetary policy  aimed  at curbing inflationary pressures - caused an
increase in unemployment from 4.8% to 6.5%15.  The unemployment rate was muchI  hiigher
in the poorest quintile, rising there from 18% to 22% (See Cowan and De Gregorio. 1996).
Since labor earnings are such an important component of the incomes of the poor, the
reduction in the demand for unskilled labor which is behind the above employment figures
is bound to have contributed to the recorded decline in their overall incomes. l  6It  means, of
course, that the sustained increases in social welfare achieved from 1987 to  1  992 will not
continue unambiguously into  1994, despite continued GDP growth. Similarly, for some
(low) poverty lines there would be an increase in poverty from 1992 to 1994, as indeed was
the case for some poverty measures with respect to the indigence line reported in the next
section.
Table 5 abstracts from means and allows us to focus on inequality, as depicted by decile
shares. The overall impression is once again of a stable (mean-normalized) distribution,
In the three months  ending  November  (the CASEN  survey  month)  of both  years,  according  to Cowan  and
De Gregorio  (1996).
16See  also Beyer  (1995),  for an interesting  discussion  of the patterns  of employment  and labor  force
participation  in  the first quintile.17
with  changes  in  shares  being generally  small  in  proportion to  the  shares  tlhemselves.
Nevertheless, there is  some evidence of the trend for a compression at thle bottom and
increased dispersion at the top, certainly until 1992. For the first three years in thle sample,
decile shares for the bottom three deciles rise, while those for deciles 8 and 9 fall. The top
decile is trendless, but there is some indication that incomes at the very top are climbing
faster than others, with the share of the richest 1% of the population rising over the period.
1994, however, does represent a break in this trend. The decline in mean incomes at the top
and bottom must imply a reduction in shares for deciles I and 10. Since the overall mean
continued to  grow, we in fact see a reduction in the shares of the first three deciles.  The
gainers were the middle-classes, broadly defined, of deciles 4 to 9. It must be emphasized,
however, that despite an absolute loss in incomes in the bottom decile - which does have
implications  for  poverty  and  welfare  - it  would  be  wrong  to  conclude,  as  many
commentators have, that inequality increased unambiguously from  1992 to  1994. This is
because decile shares provide merely a (somewhat) disaggregated view of the distribution,
rather than an accurate yardstick of inequality. There is no Lorenz dominance of 1  992 over
1994 and,  indeed,  three  of  our  four measures  actually  fall  in  that  interval.  From the
evidence presented in this study, one could only claim that inequality (defined so as to be
consistent with the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle) has worsened if he chose E(2) as the
only measure that mattered.
In closing this section, we turn to the results of our stochastic dominance analysis. As the
preceding  discussion  illustrates,  inequality  comparisons between  different  distributions
depend on the specific measures being employed, and ambiguities are often inevitable. The
concept of stochastic dominance, which originates from the analysis of financial risk, was
introduced to the field of income distribution analysis to help establish when unambiguous
comparisons of inequality or social welfare are possible.
Distribution  A  displays  first-order  stochastic  dominance  over  distribution  B  if  its
cumulative distribution function FA(Y)  lies nowhere above and at least somewhere below18
that of B, FB(Y).  For any income level y, fewer people earn less than it in A than in B. If
that  is the case, a  theorem due  to  Saposnik (1981) establishes that  any  social welfare
function which is increasing in income will record higher levels of welfare in A than in B.
Distribution A displays second order stochastic dominance over B  if its deficit flunction
Yvk
(the integral  of the  distribution  function  G(yk)=  fF(y)dy  ) lies nowhere  above  (and
(
somewhere below) that of B. It is a weaker concept than its first order analogue. and is in
fact implied by it. Shorrocks (1983) has shown that if it holds, any social welfare function
that is increasing and concave in income will record higher levels of social welifare in A
than in B.
The dominance criteria described above are alternative concepts suitable  for comparing
welfare. Inequality requires us to abstract from the mean, and concentrate on the dispersion
of  the distribution.  For this  purpose,  mean-normalized  second-order dominaince - also
known as Lorenz dominance - is the appropriate concept. Distribution A is said to Lorenz
dominate distribution B if the Lorenz curve associated with it lies nowhere below, and at
least somewhere above that associated with  B.  A Lorenz curve is a  mean-niormalized
integral of the inverse of a distribution function: L(p)  fF-(;r)d7  . In  other  words,
it plots the share of income accruing to the bottom p% of the population, against p.  For a
Lorenz curve (A) to lie everywhere above another (B) means that in A, the poorest p% of
the population receive a greater share of the income than in B, for every p. Atkinson (1970)
has shown that if it holds, inequality in A is lower than in B according to any inequality
measure that satisfies the Pigou-Dalton transfer axiom.
Table 6 below presents the results of these three types of dominance comparison among the
'four years for which we have CASEN data, for both income concepts. The comparisons
were carried  out  first  at the percentile level  of  aggregation, and  then checked  for  the19
completely disaggregated sample, with its statistical significance tested according to the
endogenous bounds method of Howes (1993). A letter F, S, or L in cell (i, j)  in Table 6
indicates that year i respectively first-order, second-order or Lorenz dominates year j.  The
letter was inserted when dominance was found at the percentile level. An asterisk indicates
that the dominance was statistically significant at the 95% confidence level over a range
greater than or equal to 99% in Howes's endogenous bounds test for the complete sample,
and hence that the hypothesis of no population dominance can be rejected at that level.
This analysis was carried out for both the household income per capita and the household
income per equivalent adult distributions, and the results (including their significance tests)
were identical in every case except one. The exception was the (statistically insignificant)
Lorenz dominance of  1994 over  1990, which was found only for the per capita income
distribution,  and  is  therefore  entered  in  brackets  in  the  table  below.  All  Lorenz
comparisons for equivalised income display crossings.
Table6t:  Welfire andl[n  al  Stochastic  Dominance  Comparisons
1987  1990  1992  1994
1987
1990
1992  F*,  S*  S*
1994  F*, S*  F*, S*, (L)
Two observations can immediately be made: first, there are a number of significant welfare
dominance results below the diagonal, indicating that welfare rose unambiguously from
some earlier to some later years. Second, with the exception of the statistically insignificant
case of 1994 over  1990 for per capita income, there are no cases of  Lorenz dominance.
This suggests that, with the possible exception of an improvement between 1990 and  1994,
inequality comparisons between the years in this period are ambiguous, and will depend on
the specific measure used. This confirms the results presented in Table 3 above.20
Much more can be said in terms of the evolution of social welfare. Since our measure of
welfare depends entirely on income, as discussed in the introduction, one would expect
rapid economic growth to have a powerful impact. Nevertheless, the dominance results are
interesting because they tell us something about the distribution of  the gains froil  growth
across households. Rapid growth between 1987 and 1990, for instance, was not sulfficient
to  lead to  unambiguous welfare  gains, because the  poorest  one or  two  percent  of the
population were worse off in 1990. Gains above the second or third percentile meant that
there was  still a rise  in the mean income of the first decile, as reported earlier  in this
section. The very disaggregated nature of dominance analysis allows us to capture finer
changes. This loss to the very poorest people in Chile at the end of the last decade meant
that  welfare  functions very  sensitive to  their circumstances  would  not  have shown  an
increase in social welfare since 1987, despite the substantial increase in incomes elsewhere
in the distribution.
Growth from  1990 to  1992 did not seem to have this perverse effect at the bottom of the
distribution. Income rises across every percentile ensured that  1992 and  1994 both first-
order  dominate  1987. Both  years  also  second-order dominate  1990.17 1994 and  1992,
however, can not be ranked, whether by the first or second order criterion. This is due to a
decline in incomes for those below the eighth or ninth percentile (which, on this occasion,
was sufficient to lower the mean income of the first decile, as seen in Table  4 above),
which co-existed with gains for all other social groups. This welfare loss to the very poor
means that social welfare can not unambiguously be said to have risen over the last two
years in our sample. The loss was not sufficient, however, to outweigh gains to those at the
bottom of the distribution since 1990: 1994 does display first-order dominance over both
1987 and 1990.
17 1992  does not first-order  dominate  1990  because  of a crossing  above  the 99th percentile.  Except  for the
very rich, everyone (in an 'anonymous'  sense) was better off in 1992  than in 1990.21
These results add rigor to our earlier analysis, while broadly supporting its findinigs.  The
first  fundamental  feature  of  the  period  is  economic  growth,  which  led  to  welfare
dominance of the last two years over the first two. On two occasions, however, economic
growth  failed to  improve measured  living standards for the  most vulnerable  people in
society: from  1987 to  1990 and, more famously, from  1992 to  1994. For thlose pairs of
years, no such unambiguous welfare comparison is possible.
The second fundamental feature - the relative stability in the dispersion of the distribution,
but with a slight compression at the bottom and a stretching at the top - is also collmpatible
with the absence of significant Lorenz dominance results. Such changes in the shlape  of the
density function, reducing distances in one part of the distribution while simultaneously
increasing  them  elsewhere,  is  exactly what  causes  different  inequality  indices  to  rank
distributions  in opposite ways. While this  section has  emphasized that the evidence on
inequality is not sufficiently clear to identify any real tendency in either direction, so that
the most  appropriate description  is one of  broad  stability or inconclusive chaniges, the
(insignificant) Lorenz dominance of 1994 over 1990 for the per capita income distribution
does confirm that, if one were really pushed to suggest a direction for change in inequality
over the period, it would more likely be a reduction.
4.  The Evolution  of Poverty
The high  GDP growth rates achieved by Chile over the last ten years have ulldeniably
contributed to a considerable reduction in poverty from the relatively high  levels of the
mid-1980s. This section presents detailed results on the changes between 1987 and  1994,
relying on  our adjusted  data set  and  comparing the numbers  for  household  per  capita
income  with  those  for  household  income  per  equivalent  adult.  Though  the  general
downward trend confirms previous  findings  (see,  e.g.  Larranaga,  1994, and  Conitreras,
1995), these new numbers reflect our adjustments, such as the incorporation of regional
price  differences,  the  new  equivalence  scale  adopted  and  the  improved  treatment  of
domestic servants. Before presenting the specific results, we briefly discuss the derivation22
of the poverty lines, with respect to which all of the measures must be understood.
We use three poverty lines in this study, all of them expressed in 1994 Santiago pesos per
month: an indigence line set at P$15,050, a lower-bound poverty line set at P$30.  1  00, and
an upper-bound poverty line equal to P$34,164. The first two are the official indigence and
poverty lines widely used in Chile. The incomes with which they are compared, lhowever,
differ from most earlier studies in that they have been 'converted'  to 1994 Santiago pesos,
using as 'exchange rate'  the regional price index in Table  1 and the November CPI. The
derivation of the upper-bound line is explained below.
All three lines are absolute poverty lines, and derive from a standard food basket specified
by  CEPAL. The basket is  chosen so as to  provide 2,187 Kcal per  person per  day, the
national  average  caloric  requirement,  which  is  obtained  from  the  demographic
characteristics of the population and from the FAO/WHO recommended caloric intakes for
different  age and gender groups. The specific commodity composition  of the  basket is
based on the actual consumption patterns of a reference group chosen by CEPAL, which is
the third quintile by expenditures in the Household Expenditure Survey of  1987/88. It is
valued at average prices for November 1994 in Santiago. The monthly cost of this standard
CEPAIL food basket has traditionally been used in Chile as an  'indigence'  (or extreme
poverty) line, separating the hard core of the poor - those whose current monthly incomes
are insufficient even for the purchase of a minimum diet - from the rest of society. In 1994,
this arrmount  was P$15,050, which is therefore reported below as the indigence line.
In accordance with international practice, however, that is deemed too strict a criterion to
identify the poor. There are, after all, other basic expenditures in addition to  food which
everyone  must  make,  such  as  shelter,  clothing  and  public  transport.  A  standard
methodology is then applied to arrive at a sensible poverty line: the cost of the food basket
is multiplied by the inverse of the food share in total expenditure (the Engel coefficient) for
some  suitable reference group. Based on the estimates of the Engel coefficient  for the
lower  quintiles  in  the  Chilean expenditure distribution,  which  are reported  in  Table  723
below, we decided to adopt the standard value of 0.5, which implies a  doubling of the
indigence line to arrive at the poverty line. 8 However, though Table 7 is reassuring in that
the coefficients  vary  little  from total  household  expenditure to  expenditure  per  capita
(suggesting  robustness  with  respect  to  the  equivalence  scale  adopted),  they  are
substantially lower for the concept of per capita income including imputed rent. Since this
is the welfare concept which we have adopted for a large part of our analysis' 9, it was felt
that its implications for poverty measurement could not be ignored. Weighing the relevant
coefficients for the first and second quintiles by 0.8 and 0.2 respectively, one arrives at an
Engel coefficient of approximately 0.44. Applying its inverse (2.27) to the cost of the food
basket yields our upper-bound poverty line of  P$34, 164.
Table 7:  Engel Coefficients: Households ordered by:
Quintile  Total Expenditure  Exp. per capita  Income  per  capita
(inc. imputed rent)
1  0.530  0.539  0.451
2  0.494  0.489  0.397
Source: CEPAL (1996), p. 31, Table 13.
We also use the same three lines discussed above when computing poverty measures using
the vector of real household incomes per equivalent adult. Given our choice of two-adult
households as the reference household type, this means that the per capita poverty line is
unchanged for that household type. As with any equivalence scale designed to take account
of different relative costs of children and of economies of scale, ours implies different per
capita poverty lines for  household types  other than the reference. This  reflects  the re-
ranking of households which the scale inherently causes. Table 8 below sets out what our
equivalence scale implies in terms of household and per capita poverty lines.
18 This  has the important  advantage  of allowing  some comparability  with the findings  of earlier  works,  most
of which  have used this line.
19 And since  the household  income  per equivalent  adult concept  also includes  imputed  rents.24
Tabr S:  Iplieid fseho'land  Per  Capia  Poverty  Lines  '  _  ____
Household Type  Equivalence  Household  Implied  Per  Capita
(1)  Factor  Poverty Line  Poverty Line
(2)  [(2) x 30,100] =  (3)  [(3) / #personsl =  (4)
Single Adult  1.2  36,120  36,120
Couple  2.0  60,200  30,100
Couple + Child (0-4)  2.3  69,230  23,077
Couple + Child (5-10)  2.4  72,240  24,080
Couple + Child(11-15)  2.8  84,280  28,093
Couple + Child (0 - 4)  3.1  93,310  23,328
+ Child (11 - 15)
Let uls now turn to the poverty measures. For a given poverty line (z), different  poverty
indices can be defined, each aggregating information on the living standards of those below
the poverty line in different ways. We work with three of the commonest measures, all of
which can be expressed as members of the following parametric class, proposed by Foster,
Greer and Thorbecke (1984):
Pa-  Y  maxy  ,
where yi is the income assigned to the ith individual (of which there are n). These measures
are rather intuitive. As is well known, when ax = 0, P simplifies to p/n, the headcount index.
When a  = 1, we have the normalized poverty deficit and ac  = 2 yields the FGT(2) measure,
which incorporates some convexity to the distances between incomes and the poverty line,
and is hence sensitive to inequality among the poor. Table 9 below lists the values of  each
of these  measures for the  whole  country, in  each relevant year,  for the distribution  of
household  per  capita incomes.  Each index is  listed for each of  the three  poverty lines
discussed above.25
Table 9:  Poverty Measures: Household Incomes per Capita
1987  1990  1992  1994
Indigence  Line:  PP$  15,050  _,  _  :'-'
Headcount  0.2209  0.1646  0.1403  0.0996
Poverty Deficit  0.0756  0.0561  0.0325  0.0336
FGT  (2)  0.0382  0.0295  0.0172  0.0184
Poverty Line  L: P$  30,100_-;___:______
Headcount  0.5137  0.4427  0.3603  0.3386
Poverty Deficit  0.2274  0.1838  0.1329  0.1269
FGT (2)  0.1299  0.1017  0.0681  0.0663
Poverty Line HR  P$ 34,164  ,  ..  '  -
Headcount  0.5679  0.5002  0.4206  0.3940
Poverty Deficit  0.2647  0.2181  0.1637  0.1554
FGT (2)  0.1560  0.1240  0.0861  0.0831
Table 10  is analogous to Table 9, and lists the values of  the same measures for thle  whole
country, in each relevant year, for the distribution of household incomes  per equivalent
adult.
Table 10:  Poverty Measures: Household Incomes per Equivalent Adult
1 1987  1990  1992  1994
Indigence Line:  PS 15,050;  ..,
Headcount  l0.1268  0.0894  0.0474  0.0511
Poverty Deficit  0.0412  0.0311  0.0174  0.0192
FGT (2)  0.0213  0.0176  0.0108  0.0118
Poverty Line L:  P$ 30,100  _  _  _  __
Headcount  0.4069  0.3306  0.2418  0.2308
Poverty Deficit  0.1568  0.1196  0.0776  0.0762
FGT (2)  0.0822  0.0614  0.0376  0.0382
Poverty Line H: P$ 34,164
Headcount  0.4726  0.3889  0.3000  0.2852
Poverty Deficit  0.1905  0.1483  0.1006  0.0978
FGT (2)  0.1028  0.0777  0.0491  0.0492
According to  all three measures, there has undoubtedly been a remarkable  reduction  in
both poverty and extreme poverty from 1987 to  1994. Poverty in Chile was quite high in
the  mid-1980s,  in  the  aftermath  of  the  serious  recession  of  1982-84.  51-57'S, of  the26
population lived in poverty in 1987, according to the per capita income concept, or 41-47%
if one relies  on the income per  equivalent adult concept, which takes better  account of
household  needs  and  economies of  scale.  By  1994, the figures were  34-39%  for per
capita incomes, or 23-29% for equivalised incomes. 21 The incidence of indigence fell from
22% to 10% by the per capita concept, or 13% to 5% by the equivalised concept.
As others have pointed out before, the reductions were largest in the years of faster growth,
frorn 1987 to 1992, and smallest in the relatively more sluggish years of 1992-94. In fact,
though  all  headcount  indices  for  the  per  capita  income  distribution  record  poverty
reductions in that latter period, as do the other two measures for poverty, it is noteworthy
that  the  poverty  deficit and  the  FGT(2) measures  for  indigence actually  record slight
increases in extreme poverty between 1992 and 1994. The picture is even more severe for
the  equivalised  income  distribution  where,  in  addition  to  increases  in  PI  and  P2,  the
indigence  headcount  also rises,  suggesting that  the number  of those  living  in  extreme
poverty increased  from  1992 to  1994, despite continued economic growth. Furthermore,
FGT(2) also rises (marginally) for the other two poverty lines as well.
This  is  a  result  of the  decline  in  real  incomes  within the  first  decile  of  thfe income
distribution, which was discussed in the previous section. Clearly, the closer a poverty line
is to that decile, the likelier it is to record an increase, whereas more generous  lines still
These poverty  ranges  refer  to the values  with respect  to the lower-bound  and upper-bouLnd  poverty  lines.
21The  poverty headcount figures for the per capita distribution are higher than those reported by various
earlier studies (see Haindl, 1996, for a survey). This is due primarily to the following methodological
corrections which have been made: (a) Some earlier studies report as a headcount the propor-tion1  of
households below the poverty line. We report the proportion of individuals below the poverty iile.
Since households tend to be larger among the poor, this increases the figure. (b) Incorporating regional
price differences raises poverty since Santiago prices are the lowest in the country: deflating incomlies
elsewhere to take this into account reduces their real incomes.  (c) Because we did not apply the
arbitrary 0.66 factor to reduce prices in rural areas (see Appendix I), we did not lower poverty lines for
rural areas. We believe that there was no justification for that practice, particularly in light of the fact
that reported figures for own consumption from household production among the rural poor did not
appear to be unrealistic. The empirically baseless reduction of rural prices by an arbitrar-y  factor might
well have been contributing to an under-estimation of rural poverty. (d) Finally, oLir  inclusioll  of
domestic servants as individuals with their own incomes - rather than those of their employer-s  - m ight
have added some individuals to the ranks of  tlhe  poor. See Appendix 1.27
record declines as a result of income gains to people in the second and third deciles. But
even for those lines, poverty measures which are more sensitive to large distances between
incomes and the poverty line (i.e. that place greater weight on greater destitution) - such as
FGT(2) - are liable to pick up the losses at the very bottom and have them outweigh gains
closer to the upper poverty lines.
This picture of considerable reductions in poverty throughout the period, albeit withi  some
ambiguity between  1992 and 1994, is confirmed by stochastic dominance analysis. It has
been shown that if a distribution A displays poverty mixed dominance (PMD(z-, z  +)) over a
distribution B, then any poverty measure which is decreasing in income, satisfies the focus
axiom and the transfer axiom (in situations where a crossing of the poverty line does not
occur), will indicate that poverty is lower in A than in B, for any poverty line between zI
and  z+.22 This  class  of  poverty  measures  includes  all  members  of  the  Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke P. class, and is therefore particularly appropriate for this study. Poverty mixed
dominance essentially requires that distribution A display second-order dominance over B
from zero to the lower bound poverty line (zI), and first-order dominance from  iz  to z
Table 11 below, which is analogous to Table 6, presents the results for Chile, witlh  zI set at
the indigence line and  z+ set  at the upper-bound poverty  line. The letter P in cell  (i, j)
indicates that  year i dominates year j. As  before, dominance was checked  for both  per
capita income  and  income per  equivalent  adult;  on  this  occasion,  both  concepts  yield
exactly the same results, so that there are no entries in brackets.
Table 11: Poverty (Mixed) Stochastic Dominance Comparisons
1987  1990  1992  1994
1987
1990
1992  P  P
1994  P  P
See Howes (1993) for a discussion, and Ferreira and Litchfield (1996) for an application to Brazil.28
These results reveal that there was unambiguously less poverty in 1992 and in 1994 than in
either 1987 or 1990, whether poverty is measured by the headcount, the poverty deficit or
indeed any  of a  host  of other sensible poverty measures, and for  any  pover-ty line set
anywhere between P$15,050 and P$34,164 per month in 1994 Santiago pesos. Thlis  sort of
unambiguous poverty reduction, quite independent of the specific measure used and valid
for  such  a  large range of poverty  lines, is not  common. Its achievement confirms the
widely held view that Chile has made substantial strides in the fight against poverty during
the last decade. 23
Yet,  there  is  also  confirmation  of  two  sub-periods  in  which  growth  did  not  lead  to
unambiguous poverty reductions:  from  1987 to  1990 and from  1992 to  1994. On both
occasions, although the headcount for the headline poverty line indicates a reduction in the
number  of  poor  people,  there  were  income  losses  in  the  lowest  percentiles  of  the
distribution.  These losses imply that  some poverty measures in  the wide  class defined
above would have indicated increases in poverty for at least some of the poverty lines in
the covered range. Indeed, in the second sub-period this was the case for all three indigence
measures reported in Table 10, for the equivalised income distribution. Still, the dominance
of 1994 over both  1987 and  1990 indicates that the losses to some of the poor in the last
two years were at least not sufficient to outweigh the gains made between 1990 and 1992.
Overall, there is no question that Chile's  growth and social policies24 were tremendously
successful in reducing the incidence, intensity and inequality of poverty between 1987 and
23  All but one of the positive  dominance  results  reported  in the above  table follow  directly  from the first
order-dominances  reported  in Table 9. The  table contains  new information  only for  the cases where
there was no dominance,  as well as for  the dominance  of 1992  over 1990,  the distribution  finctions  of
which clearly  do not cross  between  z- and z+.
24  Larrafiaga  (1994)  has decomposed  the changes  in poverty  in Chile  between  1987  and 1992  into  a growth
and a redistribution  component,  using a methodology  due to Datt and Ravallion  (1992).  While  he found
that some 80% of the reduction could be explained by the effects of growth, some of the changes were
also due to a redistribution effect, which may very well have followed - at least in part - fiom the
government's  social policies and expenditures.29
1992, with the poverty deficits being roughly halved across all three poverty lines (a little
less for the per  capita incomes, a  little more for the equivalised  incomes). The recent
reversal in  the performance of the poorest  of the poor,  between  1992 and  1994, does
however provide a cautionary signal against complacency.
5.  Static and Dynamic Decompositions of Inequality
This paper has focused on a detailed description of the levels of and clhanges in poverty,
inequality and welfare in Chile during the last decade. This section briefly discusses some
of the structural factors which may explain Chilean inequality. The analysis relies on two
sets of inequality decompositions: the first group are static decompositions, whicil aim to
separate inequality measures into within-group and between-group components. and  the
second set are dynamic decompositions, which shed some light on the nature of clhanges  in
inequality over time. The income concept used for all decompositions is houselhold  income
per equivalent adult.
The basic  idea behind static  inequality decompositions  is that  household  and  personal
characteristics, such as education, gender, occupation and regional location, are important
determinants of household income. If that is the case, then at least part of the valuLe  of any
given inequality measure must reflect inequality between people with different educational
levels, occupations, genders, and  so on. This inequality is referred to  as thle "between-
group"  component.  But  for any  such  partition of the  population  - whether by  region,
occupational sector or any other attribute - some inequality will also exist among people in
the same sub-groups; this is the "within-group" component. While inferring causality from
such decompositions requires considerable circumspection, especially when the attribute
defining the partition is variable (such as education), one often refers to the between-group
component as the share  of inequality  'explained'  by that particular  attribute, while  the
within-group component is 'unexplained'  or residual.30
Although many common inequality measures are not decomposable across such partitions
in a meaningful way, all members of the Generalized Entropy class can be decomposed in
a very simple form. Let rl(k) be a partition of the population into k subgroups, indexed by
j.  Let p(y)j be the mean income in subgroup j; E(cc)j be the inequality measured for the
population in subgroup j; fj = nj/n be the population share of subgroup j ; and  v/  = n  (Y)j
.1np(y)
be  the income  share of  subgroup j.  If we  define the between-group componenit IB  as:
ISa=  2 rf  (Y).I  )-  and  the  within  group  component  lw  as:
k
IW=  E  w,jE(a)  j  where the weights are given by:  w 1 =  v,  f>l  ,  then Cowell and .Jenkins
.j=J
(1995) show that overall inequality I can be written simply as I = II, + I,F,  25
The  share  of  inequality  explained  by  a  given partition  HI, for  a  specific  Generalized
Entropy  measure  I,  which  is  reported  in  Table  12,  is  simply  RB(HI)  =  l 1 1(Fl)/l. This
'explained'  share depends not only on the attribute defining the partition, but also on the
specific member of the Generalized Entropy class being decomposed. Below, we use the
following  household  or  personal  attributes to  define  partitions:  the  region  where  the
household lives; its urban/rural status; gender of head; age of head; education of head and
occupation of head. The value of RB for each of these partitions is given in Table 12 below
for both the mean log deviation (E(0)) and the Theil index (E(1)). It constitutes a measure
of the relative importance of the relevant attribute in explaining inequality, as measured by
the specific index.
The regional partition divides the population into 13 subgroups, according to whichc  of  the
country's  13 regions the household is located in. Naturally, the urban/rural partition divides
the population into two subgroups, as does the partition based on gender of the household
25  Cowell and Jenkins (1995) draw on earlier work by Bourguignon  (1979), Cowell (1980) and Shorrocks
(1980 and 1984).31
head. The partition by age of the head of the household creates six sub-groups: less than 25
years, 25 to 34 years, 35 to 44 years, 45 to 54 years, 55 to 64 years and 65 years or older.
The education partition divides households into five subgroups, according to whether the
head has less than four years of schooling, between four and  seven years of schooling,
between  eight  and  eleven  years  of  schooling,  between  twelve  and  fifteen  years  of
schooling, or more  than fifteen  years  of  schooling. The occupational  partition  divides
households into eleven groups, according to whether the head reports an occupation which
fits into the following sectoral categories: outside labor force; unemployed; agriculture;
mining;  manufacturing;  utilities  (electricity,  gas,  water);  construction;  commerce;
transport, storage or communications; financial and other 'entrepreneurial'  services; social
and personal services.
TabIo 12: Statc  Decomposition Results:  RB
Partition  1987  1990  1992  1994
E(0)  E(l)  E(0)  E(1)  E(0)  E(1)  E(0)  E(1)
Region  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.08  0.06  0.08  0.06
Urb/Rur  0.07  0.05  0.02  0.02  0.04  0.03  0.05  0.04
Gender  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00
Age  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02
Education  0.30  0.32  0.26  0.24  0.32  0.31  0.26  0.24
Occupation  0.10  0.10  0.09  0.09  0.07  0.06  0.10  0.08
Fine  0.58  0.58  0.55  0.55  0.56  0.55  0.55  0.54
Table  12  sheds  considerable  light  on  the  relative  importance  of  these  personal  and
household attributes in explaining inequality. In interpreting it, one  should bear in mind
that each individual decomposition is unrelated to the others, so that the RB values are not
analogous to partial derivatives or regression coefficients in a multiple regression.  Each
partition does not control for the other attributes. The first finding is that regional location
can not  account for a very  substantial share of observed inequality in Chile. Though its32
importance rose over the period, it started at 5% and never reached 10% of the total. While
this suggests that broad regional income disparities, such as are observed in otlher  countries
(such as Brazil or Indonesia), are not a big issue in Chile, it should not be taken to mean
that  where  a household  lives is  of no  use as  a  targeting variable.  Indeed it  has  been
suggested that income disparities at the level of the comuna - rather than the region - can
be very substantial (see World Bank, 1997). Geography may be related to inequality but, if
it is, it is at a finer level of disaggregation than at the macro-regional level.
Inequality between urban and rural areas also fails to capture a very significant proportion
of  overall  inequality,  accounting  for  only  2  - 7%  of  the  total.  According  to  these
decompositions, however, the least important personal attributes in explaining inequality
are the gender and age of the household head. Let us take these in turn. The unimportance
of gender (0-1% of the total over the entire period) is in line with international evidence for
developing countries. Ferreira and Litchfield (1997) find a gender RB  Of 0.00  for Brazil, in
all three years investigated (1981, 1985 and 1990). Quisumbing et al (1995) used stochastic
dominance techniques  to  investigate whether male-headed households  fared better than
female-headed ones in ten developing countries, and statistically rejected that hypothesis in
most cases. Nevertheless, as these authors point out, these results refer only to inequality
between  households  headed by  males  or  females.  It  says nothing  about  labor-market
disparities or intra-household distribution between males and females, and should not be
construed as evidence relating to those important issues.26
The unimportance of age is perhaps more surprising. Life-cycle theories of human capital
and income, and considerable evidence from labor market studies, suggest that earnings are
significantly  correlated with  age, and  one  might  expect this  to  show  up  in disparities
between households headed by different age groups. The finding, which is similar to that
of Ferreira and Litchfield (1997) for Brazil, suggests that households somehow dilute those
26  See  Agrawal  and Walton  (1996)  for a survey  of labor  market  gender  issues  in a number  of developing
countries.33
earning differentials by age. Since the variable being decomposed is household income per
equivalent adult, it is reasonable to suppose that the birth of children compensates for (at
least part of) the increase in income which may accrue to a household head as s(lhe) ages.
Through childbirth or otherwise, taking households as the unit and dividing its income by
the number of equivalent adults offsets whatever income disparities exist between different
age groups in the labor market: the decomposition does indicate that inequality between
different age groups of households is not important.
The two most  important attributes for explaining inequality in  Chile are education and
occupational sector of the household head. And of the two, education is clearly the crucial
factor. Depending on the measure and on the year, between one-quarter and one-tlird  of
total  inequality  is  accounted  for  by  differences  in  the  educational  attainment  of  the
household  head, with  mean incomes for each category rising markedly  witlh sclhooling.
Compared to  this, even the 6 - 10% accounted for by occupational sector seems  small,
particularly  in light of the fact that educational differences are not  controlled for in the
occupational decomposition. This result suggests that the current policy focus on education
is not misplaced, and that continued improvements in educational attainment by the poor
are likely to lead to  reductions in overall inequality, in addition to their direct effect  on
poverty reduction.
Finally, the bottom row of Table 12 refers to the proportion of overall inequality which is
explained by differences between the 5720 subgroups in a fine partition by all six attributes
in the table, combined together. This proportion is remarkably consistent over time  and
across  the  two  measures,  remaining  always  in  the  54-58%  range.  By  international
standards,  this  is  a  relatively  high  proportion  of  overall  inequality  accounted  for  by
personal  and  household  attributes  (see  Cowell  and  Jenkins,  1995,  and  Ferreira  and
Litchfield, 1997). Nevertheless, looked at in another way, these figures indicate thlat even
when the population has been very finely partitioned, into nearly 6,000 subgroups - each of
which consists  of households that  live in the same region and  zone, and  whose heads
belong to the same gender, age, education and occupational categories - still some 42-46%34
of total  income inequality is within-group, and can not be accounted for by differences
between the subgroups. This is in line with the international experience that inequality is
not only a complex variable to measure without ambiguity, but also a phenomenoll whose
magnitude is difficult to explain by the standard set of personal or household attributes.
Turning now to the changes in inequality, we rely on a decomposition of the mean log
deviation (E(O)), due originally to Mookherjee and  Shorrocks (1982), which  separates a
change  in  overall  inequality  into four  components, again  in relation  to  a  partition by
household attributes. Mookherjee and Shorrocks (1982) have shown that the overall change
in E(O)  can be well approximated by the following expression:
AE(O)  I  E(O) Af  X + L [2i  -1og(2)]^Af'  +  (a + b)
I(V-  4)A log(U(y) 1 )+  (c)
J=1
k
I  f^h E(O) i  (d)
Ji=l
where an overbar indicates a simple average of the values of the variable at t and at t+1;
and kj = j(y)j/t(y)  is the ratio of subgroup mean to overall mean.
The decomposition has four additive terms (a - d). The sum of a and b gives the population
shares effect; c is the relative mean incomes effect, and d is the unexplained effect. Their
values (after both sides are divided by E(O))  are entered in Table 13 below for the indicated
partitions and time intervals.35
Table1;3v  Dynamic  Decomposition  Results:  1987  - 1994
%AE(0)  -8.7
Partition  a  b  c  d
Region  0.0  0.0  1.5  -10.2
Urb/Rur  0.7  -0.8  -1.3  -7.3
Gender  0.0  0.0  -0.8  -7.9
Age  -0.4  -0.1  1.4  -9.5
Education  2.1  4.2  -10.8  -4.1
Occupation  3.3  1.3  -2.1  -11.1
a and b  measure the 'population shares' effect;
c  measures the 'mean incomes' effect;
d measures the 'unexplained'  effect.
In interpreting the table, we note that the overall change in E(0) was negative in the period
considered (see Section 3),27  and that a negative sign in any component indicates that that
term contributed towards the decline in inequality as measured by the mean log deviation.
The first remarkable observation is that in all cases but education, the decline in overall
inequality is not predominantly accounted for by either changes in population shares (due
to  households moving across subgroups in such a way as to reduce the between-groups
component) or by changes in relative sub-group mean incomes. In fact, in all those cases it
is the  unexplained effect (due to  changes in  inequality within the sub-groups  over the
period), which accounts for most of (or more than) the total change.
This can be interpreted to mean that the decline in inequality (as measured by the bottom-
sensitive E(0)) between 1987 and 1994 is not primarily due to any reallocation of people
27 The overall  change in E(O)  differs  slightly  from the change  that can be derived  from Table  3, due  to small
sample  differences  resulting  from the elimination  of households  with  missing  values  for partition
variables  (e.g.  education,  age, etc.). Note also  that for some of the partitions,  the four effects  do not add
up to the total change.  That is due  to the fact that  the decomposition  is an approximation,  which is
usually - but not always  - very  close  to the exact decomposition.  See  Mookherjee  and Shorrocks
(1982).36
across regions, or from rural to urban areas, or across age or occupational groups. Neither
is it due to reductions in the disparities between the mean incomes of subgroups in those
partitions.  For all  of  those partitions,  the  dynamic decomposition  assigns most  of  the
change to the unexplained or residual 'within-group' changes. An insight into wlhat  may lie
behind  these within-group changes comes from the  education partition:  here, the  most
important component of the decomposition was a reduction in disparities betweeni mean
incomes across education sub-groups. Unexplained changes go in the same direction, but
fail to  completely  offset  the increase  in inequality coming  from  the population  shares
effect,  so that  the overall  change (-8.7%) is  in  fact less than the  mean  incomiie  effect
(-10.8%). This suggests that the reduction  in this bottom-sensitive inequality mieasure -
which is most likely to reflect the compression at the lower tail of the distribution to which
we referred in Section 3 - is due to a reduction in the returns to higher levels of education,
caused by a gain in the incomes of the unskilled. The (inequality-augmenting) clhanges in
the educational structure of the population (terms a and b) were insufficient to fl]ly offset
the effect of the lower returns.
So,  does  the  Stolper-Samuelson  Theorem  apply to  Chile  after  all,  as  Meller  (1996)
suggested? What does this new evidence imply with regard to the secular increases in the
gap between the earnings of skilled and unskilled workers detected by Robbins and others
in the 1  970s and 1980s? While resolving this debate lies beyond the scope of this paper, we
offer a simple hypothesis, drawing on the evidence just  presented, as well as on previous
research by Robbins (1996) and Wood (1997), that reconciles the evidence of increasing
inequality until  1987-1990 and the broad  stability of the mean-normalized  distribution
since then. This  is, first,  that insofar  as the  increase in  earnings dispersion during  the
periods of active reform (1974 to the late eighties) was due to trade liberalization at all - as
opposecd to  the  deregulation  in  the  labor  market,  for  instance  - this  was  due  to  its
encouragement of what Wood  (1997) calls 'skill-biased  technical progress'.  As Chilean
firms opened up to competition with the outside world, and tariffs on capital goods were
lowered, technological change took place which raised the demand for skilled workers.
This effect, the data suggests, would have more than offset any static Stolper-Samuelson37
effect that  might have been favoring unskilled  labor.2 8 Further evidence supporting this
interpretation is supplied by Robbins (1995), who investigates the pattern of chalnges in
employment in Chile over the 1957-1992 period, and finds that most movement took place
within industries, towards more skilled employment (as one would expect from economy-
wide skill-biased technological progress) rather than across industries (as one would expect
from factor reallocation in response to price changes due to trade liberalization).
In terms of a diagram due to Leamer (1995), which was used by Wood (1997). such skill-
biased technical progress caused the relative demand for unskilled workers to fall rapidly
as trade liberalized, leading to the increased wage dispersion. As firms have caught up with
their international counterparts, and tariff levels have stabilized, the pace of skill-biased
technical progress has  slowed, however, and expansions in  the supply of skilled  labor,
brought about by the large expansion in secondary and tertiary education in Clhile  over the
last decade, now keep pace with demand.29  See Figure 1 below.
So, whereas the economic reforms of the seventies and early eighties - of wlich  greater
trade openness was one aspect - led relative wages to fall from B to C, as relative demand
for unskilled workers fell from Do to DI, rather than rising from B to A, as the inllerently
static  Stolper-Samuelson Theorem  (for many goods) would have predicted,  in  the late
eighties/ early nineties, slower rises in the relative demand for skilled workers arc matched
28 Whether  any such  effect  was indeed  present  or not remains  unclear.  The model  predictions  to which
Robbins  (1994)  and others  refer  assume  that  the two  types of labor  are the only factors  of prodLIction,
and  that all output  is tradable.  However,  though  the proportion  has been  declining,  in 1996 83%1,  of
Chilean  exports  still consisted  of minerals  (largely  copper),  food and other  agricultural  raw materials.
One could  then reasonably  suggest  that land,  rather  than unskilled  labor,  might  be the abulidanit  factor
in Chile.  As for non-tradables,  55%  of value-added  (in 1980)  was accounted  for by services.  See World
Bank  (1998).  And as Wood  himself  writes,  although  the Hecksher-Ohlin  results  (including  Stolper-
Samuelson)  are robust  to the inclusion  of more  goods and countries,  "the inclusion  of non-traded  goods
and additional  factors  can yield contrary  results  in special  cases"  (Wood,  1997,  p.36).
29 Between  1987  and 1994,  the population  shares  living  in households  headed  by people  with less  than four
years of schooling  fell from 21% to 16%.  Meanwhile;  the share  of heads  with 12-15  years  of schooling
more  than doubled  from 11%  to 25%.38
by increases in the supply of educated candidates. As demand shifts from Di to D,. supply
shifts from SI to S2, keeping the relative wages roughly stable at W.
Figure 1: lReaching Calm, after the Storm: a Dynamic Equilibrium in the Market for






Note:  With relative supply of  unskilled to skilled workers given by SI a purely static trade liberalization
process would have moved the economy from point B in the autarkic relative labor demand curve (dotted) to
point A in Do, inducing a decline in wage dispersion. However, if lower tariffs on capital goods imports and
stronger competition from abroad forces a skill-biased technical shift, the relative labor demand mig,ht shift
to D, , so that the economy ends up at C, with a higher degree of wage inequality, as observed by Robbins
(1994). However, after the initial catching up, technical progress slows to a shift from D, to D,. If education
shifts relative supply of skills from SI to S2, relative wages might remain roughly stable.
As indicated in footnote 28, we do not really believe that this simple diagram represents  a
model capable of capturing the intricate dynamics of income distribution in Chile, which is
a country with an important non-tradable sector, and exports which are at least as intensive
in  'land'  and  natural  resources  as  they  are  in  unskilled  labor.  The  links  between
international trade and personal income distribution are substantially more complex than
that (as indicated by Spilimbergo et al, 1997)30.  However, there might indeed be something
30
In preparing their aggregate results, Spilimbergo et al (1997) calculate an index of 'relative abuLidance' for
various factors, given by the log of the ratio of the country's endowment of the factor to the world's
average (weighted by population and degree of/openness). According to their figures, Chile went from
relative scarcity in both skill and land (-003 and  -0.07, respectively) in 1966, to relative abunldance
(0.43 and 0.35) in 1990. In that year, in fact, these ratios would suggest that Chile had a comparative
advantage in skilled-intensive sectors.  These trends might support Wood's (1997) other hypothiesis  -
that the entry of China and other large unskilled exporters changed the global patterns of comparative39
to Wood's  insight that what lay behind the secular increase in inequality before 1990 was
skill-biased  technical  progress,  accelerated  by  the  competitive  pressures  of  trade
liberalization. This is supported by the employment evidence of Robins (1995).
It is also compatible with our findings of a roughly stable distribution of income in 1987-
1994. Over this period, tariffs and other forms of protection had stabilized at their new,
post-reform  levels. The pace  of  increase in  the demand  for skills  ought  to  lhave been
reduced, just  as educational  spending increased,  driving up the rate  of  increase  in the
relative supply of skilled workers. By itself, this would not only lead to a rouglily stable
distribution of incomes, as we observed. It would also  lead to the observed declines  in
poverty, to the compression of incomes at the lower tail, and to the results described in
Table  13:  as  people  move  from  lower  within-group  inequality  subgroups  (with  less
education)  to  higher  within-group  inequality  subgroups  (with  more  education),  the
population share components of the Mookherjee and Shorrocks decomposition are positive.
But this movement has a compressing effect on the ratio of mean incomes across education
subgroups (with population shares constant). For a measure very sensitive to the bottom of
the distribution, this has led to a decline in measured inequality. Overall, however, as we
know from the Lorenz dominance analysis and from the behavior of the Gini coefficient
and the Theil index, inequality was broadly stable - as represented by a stylized stable w .
6.  Conclusions
In presenting an overview of poverty, inequality and welfare trends in Chile during the last
decade, this paper has sought to establish a number of empirical conclusions which can be
drawn with confidence from a careful treatment of the data. these can be summarized as
follows.  Chilean  inequality  is  high  by  international  standards,  and  remained  largely
unchanged  between  1987  and  1994.  Scalar  inequality  measures  - such  as  the  Gini
advantage.  They  also  highlight  the dangers  of basing  'storm-in-a-tea-cup'  academic  debates  on1
presumptions  of factor  endowments  which  are not supported  by the data.40
coefficient and the Theil index - varied little over the period, and there was no statistically
significant Lorenz dominance between any of the years in the sample.
Within this broad picture of stability in inequality, however, there is some evidence that the
shape of the density function may have altered slightly, with a compression at the lower
tail (reducing bottom-sensitive inequality measures such as the mean log deviation), and an
increase in dispersion at the upper tail (leading to rises in top-sensitive measures such as
the coefficient of variation).
Economic growth  has had a  substantial and clearly beneficial  impact, helping  slhift the
distribution  function to the right. Welfare, as measured by any reasonable social welfare
function, was unambiguously higher in both 1992 and 1994 than it had been in either  1987
or  1990.  Poverty  was  similarly  incontrovertibly  lower.  The  bulk  of  these  welfare
improvements took place between 1987 and 1992, however, and the slowdown in growth
and increase in unemployment after 1992 were associated with losses to the poorest eight
or nine percent of the population. While other social groups - including many of the poor -
continued to gain, those losses at the very bottom of the distribution were associated with
an increase in indigence in those two years.
Over the w]hole  period, however, growth and other factors have led to a remarkable decline
in poverty, however it is measured, and for a wide range of plausible poverty lines. For
some of these lines, headcounts and poverty deficits were halved from 1987 to 1994.
While we have found that some assumptions underlying previous studies contributed to
underestimating  both  poverty and  inequality, whether by  arbitrarily  reducing  prices in
calculating poverty lines for rural areas, taking households rather than individuals as the
unit of analysis, or ignoring live-in domestic servants, another important adjustment made
in this  study goes in the opposite direction and suggests that previous  reports may have
overestimated poverty and  inequality. We have found that both  poverty and  inequality
measures for Chile are considerably reduced when household incomes are adjusted to take41
into account differences in needs between children and adults, and to take some account of
economies of scale inherent in the sharing of fixed costs within the household.
Finally, a preliminary investigation into the factors that may explain the structure of and
the changes in inequality in Chile suggests that education is by  far the most  important
candidate  variable. Not only  do differences  between groups partitioned  by  educational
attainment explain a much greater share of overall inequality than for any other household
attribute, but  also  it is changes in returns to  education which appear  to  lie bellind the
reduction in bottom-sensitive inequality measures over the period.
The importance  of increases  in education and the  stability of overall  inequality.  taken
together, also suggest that Chile may have reached a dynamic equilibrium between rising
demand for and supply of skills. This would explain the recent reversal (or flattening) of
the upward trend in both earnings and personal income dispersion that had previously been
identified by various authors, for periods prior to  1990. With the profound political and
economic changes of the  1970s and  1980s behind it, and  quite regardless of  its trade
patterns, Chile's income distribution is, for the moment, calm.42
Appendix  1: The Data Set.
The CASEN sampling methodology can be described as multi-stage random sampling with
geographical  stratification  and  clustering.  The  country  was  first  divided  into  strata
comprising the rural and urban sectors of each of the 13 regions.  The rural sectors were
final level strata. The urban sectors were further subdivided into three categories of towns,
according  to  population: towns  between  2,000  and  9,999  inhabitants;  towns  between
10,000 and 39,999 inhabitants; and towns with 40,000 or more inhabitants. All of the latter
were  sampled (i.e. they were  final level  strata). For other towns, there  was a  level  of
clustering in the selection of towns for sampling. At this level, with selected small towns,
all  large towns  and  the  rural  sectors,  a  first  stage  samples primary  units  ('zonas  de
empadronamiento'), with probabilities proportional to population. A second stage samples
households. This process is described in more detail in Annex III to MIDEPLAN (1992).
The  sample  sizes  for our  analysis were  as follows:  the  1987 sample  included  23,403
households; the 1990 sample consisted of 26,248 households; the 1992 sample numbered
36,587 households; and the 1994 sample covered 45,993 households. 32
Once each survey was completed, the data was entrusted to CEPAL (The United Nations
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean), which conducted two types
of adjustments to the raw figures. The first type comprises corrections for non-r-esponse,
which are made in three instances: when people who declare themselves employed report
no  income  from  their  main  occupation; when  people  who  state  that  they  receive  an
occupational or widow's  pension do not report a value for this benefit; or wlhen owner-
occupiers  of their  domiciles do not  report a  value for imputed  rent. In all three cases,
missing income values are replaced by the average value of the specific income variable in
the household  group to  which the household  belongs, where the group is defined by a
partition according to a number of variables, including region, gender of head, educational
attainment of head, occupational sector and category. See Appendix I to CEPAL (1995)
for details.
The second type of adjustment seeks to correct for under- (or over-) reporting of different
income  categories, a common problem with household income surveys everywhlere. For
this purpose, CEPAL uses as the reference point for aggregate income flows the lHousehold
Incomes and Expenditures Account of the National Accounts System (SCN) of the Central
Bank of  Chile. First, a  careful process  is undertaken to convert the  information in the
original Central Bank accounts to the income concepts surveyed by CASEN. Once that is
achieved, totals by specific income category are compared for CASEN (with recourse to
the appropriate expansion weights) and the National Accounts. Finally, the proportional
differences for each income category between the two sources are imputed uniformly to
each income recipient in CASEN, with two notable exceptions: the adjustment in capital
31  For this purpose, an urban area was any grouping of dwellings with a population in excess of 2.000.
32  These sample sizes are slightly larger than those reported in the official MIDEPLAN records of the
surveys, reflecting our treatment of live-in domestic servants as separate households. See below.43
incomes is applied only to the top quintile (of households), proportionally to the primary
incomes  (ingresos  autonomos)  of  all  recipients  there;  and  incomes  from  entitlement
transfers and gifts are not adjusted. 33 The underlying assumption justifying this  irocedure
is that mis-reporting differs fundamentally across income categories, rather thlan income
levels. 34 In fact, the imputation would be strictly correct only if the income elasticity of
mis-reporting  within  each  income  category  was  unitary.  The  only  exception  to  this
assumption,  as  noted,  was  in  the  treatment  of  capital  incomes,  which  were  imputed
proportionally, but exclusively within the richest 20% of households. A detailed account of
CEPAL's  adjustment methodology, complete with the numbers used in eachl ol' tlle four
years, is available in CEPAL (1995).
We have also made two adjustments to the data set, after it was processed by CEPAL. The
income variable from the CASEN records on which our analysis is primarily based is total
adjusted household income (YTOTHAJ), which includes all primary incomes,  monetary
transfers 35 and gifts, as well as imputed rent, after the CEPAL adjustments.  It was from
this  variable that we constructed both of the income concepts listed above - 1household
income per capita and household income per equivalent adult - by appropriate clhoice of
denominator. Our first adjustment was in the treatment of live-in domestic servanits. It is
It is suggested that the main reason for not adjusting these is that under-reporting of transfers consists
mostly of complete omissions of benefits by some households, rather than proportional under-reporting
of values by all recipients.  There being no way to identify the omitters, no adjustment was founld  which
would have improved the picture obtained from the survey.
It may be interesting to note that the proportional adjustments did vary substantially across incomiie
categories. In fact, imputed rents were consistently found to have been over-reported, and wcr  e adjusted
downwards in every survey.
We believe that the questionnaire coverage of monetary transfers from the State, whether at the federal or
municipal level, is exhaustive. Questions are asked and amounts are registered for the following
benefits: Asignaciones Familiares, PASIS, SUF, Subsidio al Consumo de Agua Potable and Subsidio de
Cesantia. See MIDEPLAN (1996) for a description of each of these entitlement benefits. Other
benefits, associated with formal employment, such as jubilaciones, pensiones de invalidez and
montepios are also included, although they are aggregated as part of primary - rather than secondary -
incomes.
36  We would have liked to use an even broader income concept, which took into account the values of the
transfers in-kind which the government makes to many households, through programs il the areas of
education, health and housing. The monitoring of these expenditures is in fact one of the objectives of
the CASEN, and an exercise of valuation of these benefits is carried out by MIDEPLAN, relying on
answers to survey questions about the usage of services and on cost data provided by the relevant
ministries. Although the methodology for these valuations is discussed in MIDEPLAN ( 1993), and a
tabulation  of the imputations  is available  for quintiles  of households  in MIDEPLAN  ( 1994),  the
disaggregated  imputations  at the household  level -which  would  have  been necessary  for OLiu  analysis -
are not made available with the other CASEN variables. This is due to alleged problems of
methodology and reliability. The results are therefore only available at the quintile level, for
distributions of households, and are of very limited comparability with the distributions used in this
study. One should bear in mind that the - often substantial - value of these services, many of which are
targeted, is omitted from the income data, when interpreting the distributional results that follow, or
attempting to draw any conclusions about the social policies followed during the period.44
unclear how previous studies treated them, since YTOTHAJ is defined to exclude their
incomes. Household-based studies are likely to have unwittingly excluded them from the
sample altogether, by simply imputing YTOTHAJ to the household. For this  Report, in
households with live-in domestic servants, all other members received YTOTHAJ divided
by  the  appropriate  denominator (their  number  in  the  per  capita  income  case,  or  the
equivalence  scale  defined  over  them),  while  the  servants  were  treated  as  a  separate
household,  whose income was the sum of total adjusted individual incomes (YTOTAJ)
over them.
The second adjustment was to exclude from the analysis the three richest households in the
1994 sample. This decision was carefully considered, and was based on the impression that
these households reported sufficiently disproportionate incomes to be regarded as genuine
outliers. 37 This impression was reinforced by the fact that two of these households were
identical in every respect, having clearly been double-sampled  38, and by the position of the
three households as outliers in a plot of the Pareto distribution of the top 1% of the sample.
The value of E(2)  - see below  - when  the outliers  are included,  is 6.58 in 1994.  Its range over  the other
years is from 1.39  to 1.74.
38 The practice  of imputing  all values  from one household  (randomly  selected  within  the cluster)  to another,
when  the  latter  has  failed  to respond,  is often  adopted  as a way  of maintaining  representativeness  within
a small  cluster.  When  the 'doubled' household  are the Rockefellers,  the practice  requires  revision.45
Appendix 2: Inequality and Welfare Analysis for Per Capita Incomes.
For comparability purposes, this Appendix replicates some of the analysis described in
Section 3 for household incomes per equivalent adult, using instead the distributions of
household income per capita. This is not only intended to show that the main results of the
paper are remarkably robust to the choice of unit, but also to enable comparisons with other
studies found in the earlier Chilean literature.
Table A2.1 below is analogous to Table 3, and reports mean and median incomes, as well
as the same four inequality measures, for the per capita distributions. Two changes from
Table 3 are noteworthy. First, there is a decrease in the absolute values of the miean and
median  incomes  for each year, which  follows from the fact that there  are many more
households for which the denominators are reduced by the application of the equivalence
scale used in Section 3, than there are households for which they are increased.'9 Second,
all inequality measures are higher for this distribution than for the distribution of incomes
per equivalent adult. This is in keeping with international experience, where  it lias been
repeatedly found that the per capita income distributions generate upper-bound values for
inequality, when compared to other assumptions about differences in needs and economies
of scale within the household (see Coulter et al, 1992, and Ferreira and Litchfield,  1996).
The reason is essentially that large households, or those with many small children, are re-
ranked upwards from the per capita to the equivalised distribution, with the usual impact of
reducing overall disparities.
Table A2.1: Descriptive Statistics: Household Incomes per Capita
1987  1990  1992  1994
Mean Income  55,367  63,293  75,371  78,281
Median  29,148  34,153  40,378  43,277
Gini  0.5603  0.5563  0.5534  0.5454
E(0)  0.5611  0.5495  0.5287  0.5212
E(1)  0.6349  0.6509  0.6551  0.6194
E(2)  1.3903  1.7447  1.6680  1.7121
Despite  those  level  changes,  there  are  no  modifications  to  the  perceived  trends  in
inequality: the Gini still suggests a slight downward trend, but is basically stable. The Theil
index, too,  is  trendless.  The mean  log  deviation  continues to  indicate  a  reduction  in
bottom-sensitive inequality, and the E(2) continues to point to a gradual increase in top-
sensitive inequality. This picture is broadly confirmed by the mean incomes and shares of
Only single-person  households  would  have  an increased  denominator,  and would  have lower  entries  in
the distribution  of incomes  per equivalent  adult  than in the per capita  distribution.46
each decile in the distribution  of household  income  per capita, as revealed  by Tables  A2.2
and A2.3  below,  respectively.
3  iW~  ile D  _  I1ehbdM Inco  0mes  p,(ta  ,
1987  1990  1992  1994
Decile 1  6676.23  7661.76  10167.84  9990.29
Decile 2  12132.12  14324.69  17705.69  18262.61
Decile 3  16318.19  19167.72  23584.72  24338.92
Decile 4  20879.13  24503.26  29437.37  30984.11
Decile 5  26126.02  30633.76  36392.34  38848.29
Decile 6  32878.11  38440.16  .45607.72  48727.70
Decile 7  42401.62  48828.75  58039.65  61619.54
Decile 8  57411.76  64844.24  76712.96  82953.61
Decile 9  87997.74  98060.98  112840.20  124861.60
Decile 10  250834.80  286449.80  343171.30  342230.30
Top Percentile  694357.20  860933.50  1078200.00  1026185.00
1987  1990  1992  1994
Decile  1  1.21  1.21  1.35  1.28
Decile  2  2.19  2.26  2.35  2.33
Decile  3  2.95  3.03  3.13  3.11
Decile4  3.77  43.87  3.91  3.96
Decile5  4.4.72  484  4.83  4.96
Decile 6  5.94  6.07  6.05  6.22
Decile  7  7.66  7.71  7.70  7.91
Decile 8  10.37  10.25  10.18  10.60
Decile  9  15.89  15.49  14.97  15.95
Decile  10  45.30  45.26  45.63  43.66
Top Percentile  12.54  13.60  14.31  12.9447
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